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Abstract: This paper uses survey data for 29,000 households from 29 transition economies to 
explore how the use of banking services is related to household characteristics, bank 
ownership structure and the development of the financial infrastructure. At the household 
level we find that the holding of a bank account or bank card increases with income, wealth 
and education in most countries and also find evidence for an urban-rural gap, as well as for a 
role of religion and social integration. Our results show that foreign bank ownership is 
associated with more bank accounts among high-wealth, high-income, and educated 
households.  State ownership, on the other hand, does not induce financial inclusion of rural 
and poorer households. We find that higher deposit insurance coverage, better payment 
systems and creditor protection encourage the holding of bank accounts in particular by high-
income and high-wealth households. All in all, our findings shed doubt on the ability of 
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1.  Introduction 
Access to banking services is viewed as a key determinant of economic well-being for 
households, especially in low-income countries. Savings and credit products make it easier 
for households to align income and expenditure patterns across time, to insure themselves 
against income and expenditure shocks, as well as to undertake investments in human or 
physical capital. Given the importance attributed to financial service access it is striking that 
there is little cross-country evidence which documents how financial access differs across 
households and, in particular how cross-country variation in the structure of the financial 
sector affects the type of households which are banked.  
This paper uses household survey data from 28 transition economies and Turkey from 
the EBRD’s Life in Transition Survey (LITS) database to (i) document the use of formal 
banking services across these 29 counties, (ii) relate this use to an array of household and 
individual characteristics and (iii) assess whether specific ownership structures in the banking 
sector and cross-country variation in financial infrastructure can explain who uses banking 
services. The LITS database provides a rich set of information about a representative sample 
of individuals across countries in Eastern and Central Europe, including information on the 
use of bank accounts and bank cards. We relate variation in the use of formal banking 
products to an array of individual and household characteristics and assess whether the 
variation in the relationship between individual and household characteristics and the use of 
formal banking services is associated with variation in bank-ownership and the development 
of the financial infrastructure across countries.  
The relationship between the ownership structure of the banking system and access to 
financial services has been intensively discussed, both in the theoretical and empirical 
literature.  On the one hand, government-owned banks often have the mandate to increase 
access to financial services by firms and households. On the other hand, foreign-owned banks 3
are often conjectured to have too centralized organizational structures and to be too risk-
averse to reach out towards the low-end of the market.  While the recent literature has 
explored the relationship between the ownership structure of banking markets and access to 
credit by enterprises, little evidence exists on the relationship between ownership structure in 
the banking system and the use of formal banking services by households. 
Upgrades in the financial infrastructure have often been advocated as instruments to 
not only deepen but also broaden financial systems. Deposit insurance has been mentioned as 
a tool to create trust in the financial system, especially for “small” savers. Similarly, 
improvements in payment systems and a broader physical outreach of the banking system, in 
the form of ATMs and POS (points of sale) terminals and branches, can reduce the 
geographic barrier that households might face when accessing banking services. Finally, 
creditor protection through credit information sharing and creditor rights might reduce costs 
and risks for banks to extend credit to larger segments of the population.  
Transition economies are an almost ideal sample to study the relationship between 
bank ownership, the financial infrastructure and household use of banking services. After the 
fall of communism, all these countries had to transform their state-owned, mono-banking 
systems into two-tier market-based financial systems.
1   Countries, however, chose different 
financial sector reform paths.
 2
                                                 
1 The state-bank systems before the transition had quite extensive networks with large shares of the population 
having savings accounts. However, besides the notable exceptions of the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary 
with high levels of financial intermediation there was little cross-country variation before the on-set of the 
transition process.  
 Some countries opted for domestic privately-owned banking 
systems through privatization or the entry of new domestic players. Others opted for foreign 
bank entry early on, be it through privatization or by encouraging greenfield entry (Claeys 
and Hainz, 2008). Countries also moved at different speed in terms of upgrading payment 
systems (Cirasino and Garcia, 2008) and institutional solutions to protect depositors, e.g. 
deposit insurance (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005). Finally, the transition economies display 
2 See Bonin and Wachtel (2003) for a survey of financial sector reforms in the transition economies.  4
substantial variation in the legislation and institutions introduced to protect creditors (Pistor et 
al., 2000; Brown et al., 2009).  
Our empirical analysis shows a large variation in the use of banking services. 
Specifically, we find that more than 90% of households in Estonia and Slovenia have a bank 
account, while less than 10% do so in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. We find that the use of banking services is more common among households 
located in urban areas, households with higher income and wealth, as well as for households 
in which an adult member has professional education and formal employment. By contrast, 
banking products are used less often by households which rely on transfer income and by 
Muslim households. We find evidence that foreign bank presence is positively associated 
with the use of banking products among high-income and well-educated households, while 
negatively associated with the use of banking products by households which rely on transfer 
income. By contrast, we find no evidence that state-bank ownership leads to a broader use of 
banking products among low-income or rural households. We also find that improvements in 
the financial infrastructure, i.e. higher deposit insurance coverage, better payment system 
development and stronger creditor protection , are associated mostly with higher use of 
banking services among high-income and high-wealth households and not necessarily 
members of marginal groups, such as the rural population or minorities.  
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on household use of formal banking 
services. Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) find a negative impact of foreign bank entry in 
Mexico on branch penetration and the number of deposit and loan accounts.  On a cross-
country level, Beck et al. (2007) find that government (foreign) ownership is negatively 
associated with outreach as measured by branch penetration (number of accounts per capita) , 
while Beck et al.  (2008) find that barriers for bank customers are higher where banking 
systems are predominantly government-owned and lower where there is more foreign bank 5
participation. Recent household survey collection efforts in Southern and Eastern Africa 
using FinScope surveys have allowed rigorous analysis of household’s use of formal and 
informal services (see for example, Honohan and King, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; Atiero et al., 
2010).
 3
We also contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between bank 
ownership structure and the use of banking services. This literature makes ambiguous 
predictions, both for the effect of foreign bank and state bank ownership. Gerschenkron 
(1962) claims that state-owned banks can overcome market failures and help channeling 
funds to strategically important projects that are neglected by private financial institutions. 
 None of the previous literature, however, has used survey data for such a broad 
cross-section of countries as the LITS data.  
4
Similarly ambiguous predictions have been made about the effect of foreign bank 
ownership.  Studies of foreign bank entry in developing countries have indicated that local 
profit motives are an important driving force for entry.
 
However, a large theoretical and empirical literature suggests mission drift by these banks 
(La Porta et al., 2002), especially where political interference in the financial system is 
rampant (Cole, 2009; Sapienza, 2004; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005).  
5
                                                 
3 There have been a series of country-level studies on Brazil, Mexico, and Romania, among others, over the past 
ten years. Most of these, however, use a sample that is geographically limited, even within the respective 
country. For a broader overview and discussion, see World Bank (2007).  
  This would suggest that foreign 
banks are interested in offering services to a broader clientele (see, for example, Focarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 2004; and Buch and Lipponer, 2004).  However, the most 
recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that foreign banks tend to “cherry pick” (see, 
for example, Detragiache et al. 2008; Gormley, 2010; and Mian, 2006), which would imply 
that foreign bank penetration would be negatively related to the broader use of financial 
4 Government-owned savings banks in Western Europe were often founded with the explicit goal of expanding 
access to formal banking services to low-income individuals and postal savings banks often achieve a large 
clientele (Baums, 1994; World Bank, 2006).   
5 Earlier U.S. based studies on foreign bank entry in the 1980s suggest that foreign banks are not interested in 
offering services to the population at large but that they primarily “follow their clients” (see Goldberg and 
Saunders, 1981a,b; Cho et al., 1987; Hultman and McGee, 1989; and Goldberg and Grosse, 1994, among 
others). 6
services. Using firm-level data from Eastern and Central Europe Giannetti and Ongena 
(2009) find that firms of all sizes benefit from foreign bank presence. Rueda Maurer (2008) 
finds that larger companies report lower financing obstacles in transition countries with 
higher foreign bank penetration, while small firms’ perceived financing obstacles do not vary 
with ownership structure. De Haas and Naaborg (2005) find that while foreign banks in 
Eastern and Central Europe initially focused on large corporates, they have increasingly gone 
down-market in recent years. We add to this literature on the effect of bank ownership 
structure by focusing on the use of banking services by individuals rather than enterprises.  
Our paper is the first to our knowledge which examines how the quality of the 
financial infrastructure and creditor protection affect the use of banking services at the 
household-level. Evidence based on aggregate cross-country data suggests that generous 
deposit insurance does not foster financial intermediation but increases the fragility of the 
financial sector Cull et al. (2005). Concerning payment system development and physical 
outreach of banks, Beck et al. (2007) show that firms’financing constraints are negatively 
associated with larger physical bank networks, as measured by branches and ATMs. Cross-
country variation in information sharing and creditor rights have been related to aggregate 
credit levels (Djankov et al. 2007) as well as to firms’ access to credit (Beck et al., 2004; 
Love and Mylenko, 2003). With respect to transition countries Brown et al. (2009) show that 
countries that established credit registries at an earlier stage have already seen a positive 
impact on firm financing, by increasing availability and lowering cost, especially to more 
opaque firms. Haselman and Wachtel (2007) show that banks in better functioning legal 
environment more willing to lend to SMEs and to provide mortgages.  
While this is the first paper documenting the use of banking services at the household-
level across transition economies and linking this to bank ownership and the financial 
infrastructure, some words of caution are due. Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, 7
and the potential endogeneity of bank ownership and financial infrastructure, we are not able 
to make causal inferences on the relationship between the structure of the banking system and 
the level of use of banking services. At the country-level our analysis therefore focuses on 
how bank ownership and financial infrastructure affects the composition of households which 
are banked. Interacting country-level characteristics with individual and household 
characteristics allows us to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Second, given the nature of the 
survey, we have limited information on the different financial services used by individuals 
and have to focus on bank accounts and bank cards. On the other hand, the survey does allow 
us to correlate the use of these two principal financial products with an array of individual 
and household characteristics.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
data and methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results and section 4 concludes.  
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
Our household-level data are taken from the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey 
(LITS) implemented in 2006. The survey covers 29 countries including 28 transition 
countries in which the EBRD operates and Turkey.
6 In each country, 1,000 interviews were 
conducted with randomly selected households, yielding a total of 29,000 observations. The 
LITS dataset includes sampling weights to account for the differences in the ratio of sample 
size to population size across countries, as well as for sampling biases within countries. We 
use these weights when calculating summary statistics, as well as throughout our univariate 
and multivariate analysis.
7
                                                 
6 The survey does not cover Turkmenistan. 
 The first part of the LITS questionnaire is conducted with the 
household head and elicits information on household composition, housing, and expenses. 
7 Details of the LITS methodology are available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/lits.htm. 8




and yields information on that person’s attitudes and values, current economic activity, life 
history, as well as personal information. We use information from the first part of the survey 
to yield indicators of household use of banking services, location, income, and economic 
activity.  From the second part of the survey we yield indicators of education, current and 
past employment status, nationality and religion Table 1 provides definitions, the sources and 
summary statistics for all variables which we employ from the LITS. 
Table 1 here 
 
We employ two indicators of household use of banking services. The dummy variable 
Account measures whether any member of the household has a bank account. The dummy 
variable Card measures whether any member of the household has a bank (debit or credit) 
card. Only 36 percent of surveyed households have a bank account while 31 percent have a 
bank card. The use of bank accounts and bank cards are naturally highly correlated: 68 
percent of households with a bank account also have a debit or credit card, and 81 percent of 
households with a debit or credit card also have a bank account. 
Table 2 shows that there is substantial variation in the use of banking services across 
countries, with banked households much more common in Central Europe than in the CIS 
countries.  More than 75 percent of households in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have a bank account, while less than 5 percent of households in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do so. Table 2 also compares 
our indicators of banking service use to existing aggregate measures of financial access from 
the EBRD transition report (Credit / GDP), the World Bank- CGAP database on financial 
                                                 
8 The second part of the questionnaire was conducted with the adult household member with the most recent 
birthday. This implies that for 40% of the households two people (the household head and another adult 
member) were interviewed, while for 60% of the households one person was interviewed (the household head). 9
access (Savings accounts and Loan accounts in proportion to the population), and Honohan’s 
(2008) estimates of the share of population that uses formal banking services. The country 
means reported in panel A of the table suggest that the aggregate number of savings and loan 
accounts may substantially overestimate the use of banking services at household level. For 
example, the total number of accounts as reported by CGAP suggests that every second adult 
person in Albania has a savings account with a bank. Our household data, by contrast shows 
that less than one-fifth of the households in Albania have a bank account. Rank correlations 
reported in panel B of the table suggest that our household-level indicators of bank use are 
highly correlated with Credit / GDP and the Honohan composite indicator, but somewhat less 
correlated with the more recently gathered measures of financial access.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
In the first step of our empirical analysis we relate our indicators of banking service 
use Bh,c of household h in country c to characteristics of the household Xh controlling for 
country level determinants with country-fixed effects Dc: 
c h h c c h X B , 1 , H E D              ( 1 )  
At the household-level we expect the use of banking services to be related to 
household location, wealth, income and income sources. The dummy variable Urban captures 
whether the household is located in an urban rather than a rural area. The dummy variable 
Homeowner measures whether the household owns its dwelling and is our indicator of 
household wealth. The variable Expenses is our measure of household income and measures 
total household expenses in USD per year.
9
                                                 
9 Household expenses are measured according to the OECD household equivalized scale 
 In addition to our measures of income level we 10
use four dummy variables to capture the main source of household income; Self-employed 
income, Capital income, and Transfer income, with Wage income as the reference category.
10
We expect household use of banking service to be related to the respondent’s level of 
education, current and past economic activity, religion and social integration. The dummy 
variable Professional captures whether the respondent to the survey has professional training 
or a tertiary-level degree. The variables Formal employed and State employed capture the 
respondent’s most recent employment history, i.e. whether the respondent had a formal 
employment contract or was employed by the government during the past 12 months. The 
variable Worked indicates whether the respondent ever worked for wages after 1989.  We use 
two indicators of social integration: Minority captures whether the respondent belongs to a 
national minority, while Language indicates whether (s)he speaks at least one official 
language. The variable Muslim is a dummy variable indicating followers of Islam.  
  
We expect that urban households and households with higher income and wealth are 
more likely to use banking services. We expect that households, which had formal 
employment in the past year, or where a family member worked for wages in the past, are 
more likely to have a bank account, while we expect that households which rely on self-
employment and transfer income to be less likely to use banking services. Minority 
households and households which do not speak an official language are hypothesized to be 
less likely to have a bank account. We expect that Muslim households may be less likely to 
use bank accounts for two reasons: First, these households may, for religious reasons choose 
not to deal with non-Islamic financial institutions which demand and offer interest payments. 
Second, in countries or regions where Muslims constitute a minority population they may 
face discrimination by banks or their employees.  
                                                 
10 Capital income includes income from renting out real estate and as well as income from other assets. Transfer 
income covers both state and private (charity) transfers. Using separate dummy variables for these two transfer 
categories yields qualitatively similar findings.  11
In the second step of our analysis we examine how the structure of bank-ownership in 
each country as well as the development of the financial infrastructure affect the use of 
banking services across household types. Specifically, we focus on the interaction of four 
indicators of bank-ownership as well as four indicators of the financial infrastructure with our 
vector of household-level explanatory variables, controlling for level effects across countries 
with country fixed effects.  
c h c h C c h Z X B , h 1 , X *   H E D             ( 2 )  
where Zc is one of eight country-level indicators.  
We use four indicators of bank-ownership. Foreign banks and State banks measure 
the share of banking assets controlled by foreign-owned and state-owned banks respectively 
and are taken from the EBRD transition report. While in Turkey foreign banks had only 4 
percent of total banking assets in 2003-2005, their market share was over 90 percent in 
Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovak Republic. While there were no state-owned banks in 
Armenia, Estonia, Georgia and Lithuania, their market share was 56% in Azerbaijan. Using 
data from de Haas et al. (2010) we consider two separate categories of foreign banks, the 
market share of Foreign greenfield banks and the share of Foreign takeover banks.
11
We also employ four indicators of the financial infrastructure. First, we consider 
Deposit insurance coverage as indicator of the financial safety net to assess whether the 
  While 
the former are banks that were established anew by international banks, the latter are existing 
banks that changed ownership through sale to international banks. In Estonia, international 
banks only entered through takeovers, while 56 percent of foreign banks in Croatia are 
greenfield and 39 percent takeover banks.  
                                                 
11 The sum of foreign greenfield and foreign takeover banks does necessarily add up to the share of all foreign 
banks, as the data come from two different data sources. The foreign bank variable is from the EBRD transition 
report and is based on the full sample of banks in each country. The foreign greenfield and foreign takeover 
variables are taken from the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS), which only covers 
a subsample of the banks in each country (de Haas et al, 2010) 12
degree to which depositors are insured is associated with differences in the composition of 
the depositor population. This variable indicates the deposit insurance coverage relative to 
GDP per capita and is from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005). Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Mongolia do not have an explicit deposit insurance (and therefore a value of zero), while 
Macedonia has a value of 9.9. Turkey is the only country with unlimited deposit insurance 
and we therefore set its value to 10.   Second, we use an indicator of payment system 
development and the physical outreach of the banking system, as captured by the number of 
point of sales terminals (POS terminals) per one million inhabitants. This indicator is 
measured for 2006 and taken from the World Bank’s Global Payment Survey (Cirasino and 
Garcia, 2008).  In Kyrgyzstan, there are 100 POS terminals per one million inhabitants, while 
there are almost 18,000 in Turkey.
 12
Based on the hypothesis that foreign banks cherry pick clients in host countries, we 
expect that foreign bank ownership may encourage the use of banking services particularly 
among urban, wealthy, formally employed, and professional households. This effect should 
be more pronounced for foreign banks that are greenfield investments than for foreign banks 
that were previously domestic, be it private or state-owned.  By contrast, if state-owned banks 
  Third, we use an indicator of the information sharing 
framework between banks. The variable Credit information is scaled between zero and six 
and captures the extent to which borrower information is being collected and shared among 
financial institutions. It ranges from zero in eight countries without credit registry to five in 
Bosnia, Estonia, Hungary and Turkey. Finally, we use an indicator of the legal framework to 
protect creditors. Creditor rights is an index the legal rights of secured creditors in- and 
outside insolvency of a company and ranges from zero to ten. The index ranges from two in 
Tajikistan to nine in Albania, Latvia, Montenegro, and Slovak Republic. Both indicators of 
creditor protection are taken from the World Bank Doing Business database. 
                                                 
12 Given its skewed distribution, we use the log of this indicator in our empirical analysis. 13
contribute to a broader access of financial services we expect that rural households, lower-
income households, and the self-employed benefit in particular from state-bank presence.  
  Our predictions concerning the relation between our indicators of financial 
infrastructure and the use of bank services are ambiguous. Low income and marginalized 
population segments, including minorities, might be more likely to open bank accounts in 
countries with a higher deposit insurance coverage. On the other hand, it might be richer, 
wealthier and better educated segments of the population who are informed about deposit 
insurance and are attracted to banks in countries with higher deposit insurance coverage.  
Finally, too generous but incredible deposit insurance might also undermine trust in banks 
(Cull et al., 2005). Better payment systems in the form of more POS terminals might entice 
especially rural population and less wealthy segments of the population to use banking 
services. On the other hand, it might be as well the richer, wealthier and more educated 
segments who are more attracted to banks in countries with better physical access 
possibilities.  
We predict that in countries with better credit information sharing and creditor rights, 
the costs and risk for banks to reach out to more marginal segments of the population might 
be reduced. On the other hand, improved creditor protection may encourage those households 
to open bank accounts which are more likely to use credit, i.e. households with wage income 
and wealthier households which anticipate that they might require a consumer or mortgage 
loan.  
 
3.  Results 
A.  Household determinants of the use of bank services 
Table 3 reports univariate results for household determinants of banking service use: We 
compare characteristics of those households with a bank account to those of households 14
without an account, as well as those with a bank card to those without a bank card. These 
sub-sample comparisons confirm our main predictions. Households with a bank account or a 
bank card are more often located in urban areas, have higher incomes, and more often have 
professional training. Also as expected, households that use banking services are less often 
self-employed, rely less on  transfer income, belong less often to a minority, are more likely 
to speak an official language, and are less likely to be Muslim. Perhaps surprisingly, users of 
bank accounts and bank cards are less likely to be home owners. This may reflect the fact that 
urban households which have more bank accounts are less likely to own their own house than 
rural households. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Many of the differences between households which use banking services and those that 
do not are not only statistically, but also economically significant. For example, households 
with a bank account have average household expenses of just over 3,400 USD per year 
compared to just 1,306 USD for households without a bank account. In 63 percent of the 
households with a bank account the responding adult has professional training, while 50 
percent of these households have formal employment. The corresponding shares for 
households without a bank account are just 44 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Further, 
while only 8 percent of the households with a bank account are Muslim, this is the case for 30 
percent of the households without a bank account. 
While these univariate comparisons show a clear difference between the banked and the 
unbanked population, many of the household and individual characteristics are strongly 
correlated with each other.  What then drives the use of banking services – income, 
education, geography, societal status or religion? To answer this question, we next turn to 15
multivariate analysis. Table 4 displays marginal effects of probit estimates for the dependant 
variables Account (columns 1-2) and Card (columns 3-4).  The standard errors in each model 
account for clustering at the country-level. For each dependent variable, we report first a 
regression with household characteristics and country-fixed effects only, before adding 
individual characteristics of the adult respondent in the household. The overall fit of our 
model is reasonably good, with Pseudo R
2 ranging from 0.37 to 0.44. While a large share of 
this is due to country-fixed effects, regressions without the country-fixed effects yield Pseudo 
R
2 of at least 0.24. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
The Table 4 results show that the use of banking services is significantly related to 
household location, income, wealth, economic activity and religion. The reported estimates in 
columns (2) and (4) suggest that urban households are 5 percent more likely to have a bank 
account and 8 percent more likely to have a bank card than rural households.  Raising 
household expenses by one standard deviation (2,331 USD) from the sample mean (2,570 
USD) increases the probability of having a bank account by roughly 12 percent and that of 
having a bank card by 10 percent. Homeowners are 3 percent more likely to have a bank 
account, although they are not more likely to have a bank card.  Households that rely on 
transfer income are 11 percent (15 percent) less likely to have a bank account (card). After 
controlling for household location and income, self-employed households are not less likely 
to have a bank account than households with wage income.  However, households which rely 
on self-employment are less likely to have a bank card, suggesting that such products are 
offered more to households with a formal income source.  16
Controlling for household income and economic activity, households with a professional 
adult are 9 percent more likely to have a bank account and 5 percent more likely to have a 
bank card, suggesting that literacy (and thus maybe also financial literacy) does affect bank 
use. Households with an adult who has formal employment are 8 percent more likely to have 
a bank account and bank card. Finally, our multivariate results suggest that there is a 
significant impact of social status and religion on the use of banking services.  Not speaking 
the official language reduces the likelihood of having a bank account by 8 percent, while 
being member of a national minority reduces the probability of having a bank card by 2 
percent. Being a Muslim reduces the probability of having a bank account / card by 8 and 5 
percent, respectively. 
How robust are our household-level results across countries? To check the robustness of 
our results we replicate model 2 in Table 4 for each country separately. The results displayed 
in Table 5 suggest that the positive relation between the use of a bank account and household 
income, household education or reliance on transfer income are highly robust. While we find 
substantial variation in the economic magnitude of their effect, household Expenses yield a 
highly significant coefficient in each of our country-specific regressions except for 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
13  Our indicators of education (Professional) and Transfer income 
are significant at the 10 percent level in 17 of the 29 regressions. By contrast, the effects of 
household location (Urban), economic activity (Formal employed), wealth (Homeowner) and 




Table 5 here 
                                                 
13 The estimates for some countries are imprecise, due to the fact that the prevalence of bank accounts is either 
very low ( less than 10% in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) or very high 
(more than 90%  in Slovenia and Estonia) 
14 Several of the variables are dropped from the probit regressions as they perfectly predict the outcome.  We 
therefore re-run the regressions with OLS. This affects especially the estimates for the Muslim dummy, which is 
also negative and significant for Belarus, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, and Romania. 17
 
Interestingly, the negative coefficient for Muslims in our full sample is confirmed mainly 
in the south-east European countries Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro which have 
significant Muslim populations.
15 We explore whether this negative effect of Muslim in 
south-east Europe is demand driven, i.e. the disapproval of interest-bearing accounts or 
conventional banks by practicing Muslims, or the result of supply constraints, such as 
discrimination. In order to distinguish between these two explanations, we focus on Bosnia 
and distinguish between the Serbian (Republika Srpska, RS) and the Croatian-Muslim part 
(Federation, FBH) of the country.
16
 
  If the demand constraint is dominating, we should 
observe a significant difference between Muslim and non-Muslim households in both parts of 
Bosnia.  If the supply constraint is dominating, we should observe a significant difference 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in RS, but not in FBH. Univariate comparisons show 
indeed no significant difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in FBH, while non-
Muslims are almost three times as likely to have a bank account as Muslims in RS (50% vis-
a-vis 17%).  Multivariate regressions as in Tables 5 that control for our full set of individual 
and household characteristics including income show that Muslims are 11 percent less likely 
to have a bank account in FBH and 27 percent less likely to have a bank account in RS.  
While this points to some demand constraints (as there is still a difference even in FBH), 
supply constraints seem to feature prominently as can be seen by the much larger difference 
between Muslim and non- Muslims in the use of bank accounts in RS.   
B.  Bank-ownership, financial infrastructure, and the use of banking services  
                                                 
15 Table 5 also reports a negative effect of Muslim for Poland and a positive effect for Bulgaria, but less than 1% 
of the surveyed polish households and only 11% of the Bulgarian households are Muslim.  
16 Since the LITS survey data contains the primary sampling unit in which the households are located, we are 
able to assign households to different parts of Bosnia. Our sample contains 660 households in the Bosniak and 
340 households in the Serbian part.  18
The results displayed in Table 5 show that the use of bank services across households 
displays strong country-specific patterns. These differences in the composition of banked 
households may be related to the large differences in economic development across our 
sample of countries. They may however also be driven by differences in the ownership 
structure of the banking sector as well as the financial infrastructure, which have been shown 
to affect the level of financial outreach across countries Beck et al.(2007, 2008).  
Our data confirms that the level of financial outreach across the transition economies is 
also related to bank ownership and financial infrastructure. Figure 1 displays scatter-plots 
relating the share of households with bank accounts by country to our country-level 
indicators of bank ownership (Foreign banks, State banks) and the financial infrastructure 
(Deposit insurance, POS terminals, Credit information, Creditor rights).
17
 
 The figure 
suggests that the use of bank accounts is higher in countries with a stronger presence of 
foreign-owned banks and lower in countries with a stronger presence of state-owned banks. 
We also find a positive relationship between deposit insurance coverage and the use of bank 
accounts, a relationship that is stronger if we exclude the two outliers Turkey and Macedonia. 
Similarly, we find a strong positive relationship between the development of the payment 
system (as measured by POS terminals per million inhabitants) and the share of households 
with bank accounts. Finally, the graphs suggest a positive, though weak, relationship between 
creditor rights and credit information sharing, on the one hand, and the share of households 
with bank accounts, on the other hand.  
Figure 1 here 
 
                                                 
17 Using the share of households with bank cards rather than bank accounts yields similar findings. 19
The objective of this study is to examine the composition of households which are 
banked, rather than the level of financial outreach.  In the following we therefore present 
multivariate regressions in which we examine the interaction effects of our country-level 
indicators of bank ownership (Table 6) and financial infrastructure (Table 7) with our 
household-level explanatory variables. For each model reported in Table 6 and 7 we present 
the main effects of our household-level explanatory variables in the first column and the 
interaction terms of our country-level indicators with the household variables in the second 
column. All models are estimated with OLS due to the difficulty of interpreting the marginal 
effects of interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003). Our findings, 
however, are confirmed when considering the coefficient estimates of probit models. 
Examining the differential effects of our country-level variables rather than their level 
effect mitigates the endogeneity issue inherent in our cross-sectional data. For example, it is 
just as likely that the presence of foreign banks is be driven by the number of banked 
households in a country, as that financial outreach is driven by the presence of foreign banks.  
By contrast, while it is likely that cherry-picking foreign banks will increase the share of 
wealthy, urban and professional households which have bank accounts, it is less plausible 
that foreign bank entry is driven in by the share of such households which already have 
accounts with a domestic bank. If anything, one would expect the opposite. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Table 6 presents our analysis of how bank ownership is related to the use of bank services 
by different household types. The results presented for model (1, 3, and 4) of the table 
confirm our prediction that foreign banks may cherry-pick their clients among households in 
the transition economies. In model (1) we find that Homeowners and households with higher 20
Expenses or a Professional adult are more likely to use bank accounts in countries with 
stronger foreign bank presence. In line with these results households which rely on transfer 
income are less likely to have a bank account in countries with stronger foreign bank 
presence. The composition effect of foreign bank entry seems to be stronger for greenfield 
foreign banks than for takeover foreign banks, as shown by models (3) and (4). We find that 
homeowners and households with wage earners with state employment are more likely to 
have a bank account in countries with a higher share of foreign greenfield banks, while 
households relying on transfer income are less likely to use banking services.  By contrast 
foreign takeover banks only have a (weak) negative effect on households which rely on 
transfer income.   
The results for model (2) in table 4 do not support the conjecture that state banks 
disproportionally benefit rural (rather than urban) or poorer households. In fact, our results 




Table 7 here 
 
  The Table 7 regressions show a significant impact of financial infrastructure on the 
composition of the banked population across countries.  Column (1) shows that a higher 
Deposit insurance coverage benefits mainly urban, high-wealth, high-income households and 
households with capital income. The interaction effect of Deposit insurance with household 
expenses is not only statistically, but also economically significant. Raising household 
expenses by one standard deviation (2,331 USD) from the sample mean (2,570 USD) 
increases the probability of having a bank account by 5.6 percent in a country with no deposit 21
insurance (e.g. Azerbaijan). By comparison, in a country like Poland with a deposit insurance 
coverage of 5 times per capita GDP the same income increase would raise the probability of 
having a bank account by 9.4 percent. Households that do not belong to a minority and speak 
the official language are also more likely to have a bank account in countries with higher 
deposit insurance coverage. These results suggest that higher deposit insurance coverage does 
not help expand bank penetration to marginal or “small” savers, but rather benefits the better-
off and socially-integrated households.  
The column (2) results show that a better development of the payment system, as 
measured by the log of POS terminals per 1 million inhabitants, also encourages wealthier 
and high-income households to use bank accounts. Payment system development further has 
a stronger effect on bank use by households with a history of formal employment (Worked) 
and a weaker effect on households which rely on transfer income.
18
The column (3) results of Table 7 show that high-income households are more likely to 
have a bank account in countries with more effective Credit information sharing. Also 
recipients of transfer income are less likely to do so than wage earners. None of the other 
interaction terms enter significantly. The column (4) results of Table 7, finally, show that 
homeowners are more likely to use banking services in countries with better Creditor rights.  
While households that belong to a minority are less likely to have a bank account, the results 
in column (4) suggest that better creditor rights mitigate this effect. Better creditor rights 
seem to encourage the use of banks more among households which speak the official national 
language, than households that do not. 
 
  One concern with our results is that some of the ownership and regulatory variables 
are highly correlated with GDP per capita and thus that the interaction terms with household 
characteristics might therefore reflect the effect of economic development on the composition 
                                                 
18 Using ATMs per capita as an alternative indicator of  payment system development, we find that homeowners 
are more likely to have a bank account in countries with higher ATM penetration, while the other interactions 
are not significant. Results are available on request. 22
of the banked population.  Spearman rank correlations show that our indicators Foreign 
banks (.45) and State banks (-.35), Deposit insurance (.42) and Credit information (.41) are 
only moderately correlated with per capita GDP, while the correlation is particularly strong 
for POS terminals (.75) and weak for Creditor rights (.00).   
To disentangle the compositional effects of economic development from those of our 
bank ownership and the financial infrastructure we re-run the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 
including interaction terms of all household and individual characteristics with log GDP per 
capita.
19
  Overall, the results in Table 6 and 7 suggest that bank ownership and the development 
of the financial infrastructure have substantial compositional effects on the banked 
population. Our results are consistent with hypotheses that see foreign banks catering more to 
high-income households rather than broadening access. They are not consistent with 
 The results of these regressions confirm most of our findings, but do show a weaker 
relation between foreign bank ownership, financial infrastructure and the holding of bank 
accounts by high-income and wealthier households: We find that transfer recipients are less 
likely to have a bank account in countries with more Foreign banks, while the interaction 
term of Foreign banks with Homeowner, Expenses and Professional are no longer significant 
once we control for the interactions with GDP per capita. We continue to find that a higher 
Deposit insurance coverage encourages urban residents, and recipients of capital income to 
use bank accounts, while it discourages minority households. Again, the interaction term with 
Homeowner and Expenses are no longer significant once we control for the interactions with 
GDP per capita. A better developed payments system (POS terminals) and the sharing Credit 
information encourage  richer households (as measured by Expenses) to use bank accounts, 
By contrast, the interaction term between Creditor rights and homeownership is no longer 
significant once we control for the interactions with GDP per capita. 
                                                 
19 We take the log of GDP per capita in US dollars averaged over 2003-2005 from the EBRD transition report. 
Results of these non-reported regressions are available on request. 23
hypotheses that see state bank ownership and financial infrastructure improvements 
benefitting mainly previously unbanked groups.  Higher deposit insurance coverage and 
payment system development seem to mostly encourage higher-income segments of the 
population to hold bank accounts.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper explores the characteristics of households which hold bank accounts and bank 
cards in transition countries and relates the composition of the banked population across 
countries to variations in bank ownership, deposit insurance, payment systems and creditor 
protection.  Using data across 28 transition economies and Turkey, we find a strong 
correlation of household location, income level, economic activity, education and religion 
and the use of bank accounts and bank cards. We find that households with higher wealth, 
income, and education are more likely to hold bank accounts in countries with stronger 
foreign bank presence. By contrast we find no evidence that state-bank ownership is 
associated with financial inclusion of rural and poorer households.  We find a strong effect of 
deposit insurance coverage and payment system development on the composition of the 
banked population, with higher income and wealthier segments benefiting more.  
Our result on the distributional effects of foreign bank ownership on the use of bank 
services, however, are also consistent with Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) who show for 
Mexico a reorientation of foreign entrants towards urban and richer areas of the country.  The 
fact that foreign banks cater more towards households with higher incomes, higher education 
and less reliant on transfer income might indicate that foreign banks see higher profitability 
among these groups. Our finding that government ownership of banks is not associated with 
cross-country variation in the use of banking services and does not benefit any specific group 
is consistent with a large literature on the consequences of government ownership in banking. 24
Our results shed doubt on the ability of policy levers to broaden the financial system to 
disadvantaged groups.  Specifically, attempts to broaden the use of financial services through 
state-owned banks and deposit insurance do not increase the likelihood that poorer, less 
wealthy and socially less included segments of the population use formal financial services. 
Similarly, a better contractual and information framework seems to benefit mostly the higher-
income and wealthy segments of the population, most likely by allowing the banks to 
differentiate more carefully among potential clients. Our results do not imply that these 
policies do not help broaden financial access rather that it is difficult to target them to certain 
groups.  
We see this study as a first attempt at documenting and exploring intra- and cross-country 
variation in the use of financial services. As more household surveys become available, we 
will be able to exploit time-series variation and thus address to a larger extent concerns of 
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Account Card Credit / GDP Saving accounts Loan accounts Composite
(share) (share) (in %) (per 100 adults) (per 100 adults) (in %)
Albania 0.18 0.17 10 45 10 34
Armenia 0.04 0.04 7 57 19 9
Azerbaijan 0.01 0.02 8 70 . 17
Belarus 0.15 0.23 14 . . 16
Bosnia 0.40 0.29 17 38 34 17
Bulgaria 0.18 0.41 35 199 46 56
Croatia 0.80 0.75 60 . . 42
Czech Rep 0.79 0.61 33 168 . 85
Estonia 0.94 0.82 42 275 102 86
Georgia 0.05 0.09 11 66 35 15
Hungary 0.64 0.50 45 157 . 66
Kazakhstan 0.11 0.12 28 . . 48
Kyrgyzstan 0.02 0.01 7 11 3 1
Latvia 0.65 0.63 53 122 69 64
Lithuania 0.69 0.53 31 214 38 70
Macedonia 0.20 0.14 21 130 96 20
Moldova 0.09 0.11 22 . . 13
Mongolia 0.32 0.10 29 194 27 25
Montenegro 0.29 0.21 17 . . .
Poland 0.66 0.43 29 153 . 66
Romania 0.27 0.35 16 . 43 23
Russia 0.31 0.21 24 . . 69
Serbia 0.56 0.42 26 . . .
Slovak Rep 0.79 0.48 32 . . 83
Slovenia 0.97 0.75 49 139 . 97
Tajikistan 0.01 0.01 16 . . 16
Turkey 0.24 0.30 18 185 32 49
Ukraine 0.15 0.18 27 376 . 24
Uzbekistan 0.04 0.02 25 . . 16
Mean 0.36 0.31 26 145 43 45
This panel reports means for each variable by country. The means for the variables Account and Card are adjusted for
sampling weights in the LITS survey. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 2.  Household use of banking services and access to finance
Panel A. Means by country30







Credit / GDP 0.7622* 0.8531* 1
Saving accounts 0.5944* 0.6573* 0.7902* 1
Loan accounts 0.6014* 0.7063* 0.8182* 0.6573* 1
Composite 0.7902* 0.9441* 0.8601* 0.7972* 0.6364* 1
Table 2.  Household use of banking services and access to finance
Panel B. Rank correlations
This panel reports Spearman rank correlations between the country averages for each variable. * denotes
significance at the 0.05 level. The means for the variables Account and Card are adjusted for sampling

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban 0.0662*** 0.0542*** 0.0855*** 0.0787***
[0.0161] [0.0157] [0.0141] [0.0144]
Homeowner 0.0308** 0.0251** 0.003 -0.001
[0.0126] [0.0124] [0.0150] [0.0151]
Expenses 0.199*** 0.182*** 0.168*** 0.154***
[0.0125] [0.0113] [0.00872] [0.00763]
Self employed income -0.016 0.035 -0.0760*** -0.0338*
[0.0192] [0.0219] [0.0147] [0.0184]
Capital income  0.053 0.099 -0.0817** -0.049
[0.0749] [0.0807] [0.0378] [0.0442]
Transfer income -0.166*** -0.113*** -0.195*** -0.148***
[0.0288] [0.0296] [0.0110] [0.0135]
Professional 0.0864*** 0.0517***
[0.0126] [0.0102]
Formal employed 0.0853*** 0.0849***
[0.0181] [0.0181]










Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Pseudo R2 0.43 0.44 0.37 0.38
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# Households 28,911 28,825 28,908 28,822
# countries 29 29 29 29
Table 4.   Household-level determinants of banking services
The dependent variables in this table are Account (models 1-2) and Card (models 3-4). All models report marginal
effects from probit estimations and include country fixed effects. Observations are weighted according to sample
weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country
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